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What kind mechanisms one deems central for the evolutionary process deeply influences
one’s understanding of the nature of organisms, including cognition. Reversely, adopting
a certain approach to the nature of life and cognition and the relationship between them
or between the organism and its environment should affect one’s view of evolutionary
theory. This paper explores this reciprocal relationship in more detail. In particular it
argues that the view of living and cognitive systems, especially humans, as deeply
integrated beings embedded in and transformed by their genetic, epigenetic (molecular
and cellular), behavioral, ecological, socio-cultural and cognitive-symbolic legacies calls
for an extended evolutionary synthesis that goes beyond either a theory of genes
juxtaposed against a theory of cultural evolution and or even more sophisticated theories
of gene-culture coevolution and niche construction. Environments, particularly in the form
of developmental environments, do not just select for variation, they also create new
variation by influencing development through the reliable transmission of non-genetic but
heritable information. This paper stresses particularly views of embodied, embedded,
enacted and extended cognition, and their relationship to those aspects of extended
inheritance that lie between genetic and cultural inheritance, the still gray area of
epigenetic and behavioral inheritance systems that play a role in parental effect. These are
the processes that can be regarded as transgenerational developmental plasticity and that
I think can most fruitfully contribute to, and be investigated by, developmental psychology.
Keywords: extended inheritance, parental effects, developmental niche, developmental plasticity, embodied
cognition, extended cognition, extended evolutionary synthesis
INTRODUCTION
There exist two quite different stances toward the evolution
of human cognitive capacities. The nativist stance, favored for
instance by Evolutionary Psychologists (EP), attributes the origin
of behavioral, social and cognitive capacities such as folk psy-
chology, mind-reading and general reasoning capacities to the
sudden appearance of genetically determined mental modules
or representational systems. This approach, which subscribes to
the computational theory of mind, has been polemically dubbed
the “Rational Bubble stance (which) confounds cultural sym-
bolic achievements with individual cognitive competences” and
belongs to a class of views that have in recent years come under
increasing criticism as a quite unrealistic model of cognitive
growth (McGonigle and Chalmers, 2008, p. 143). An alter-
native view, now sometimes called the embodied, embedded,
enactive, extended (4E) cognition approach, is united by its
opposition to traditional cognitivism and methodological indi-
vidualism (Menary, 2010). Despite the differences between the
separate views they all seem to agree on the necessity to place
active agency at the center of cognition and the importance of
cognition’s scaffolding through developmental, ecological, and
cultural niche construction. In addition this approach presup-
poses only very simple and modest biological preadaptations,
e.g., in the perceptual realm or general developmental plasticity
(Donald, 2000a,b; Griffiths and Stotz, 2000; Tomasello, 2000;
Sterelny, 2003; Wheeler and Clark, 2008; Stotz, 2010).
There is natural affinity between one’s view of the nature of
the mind and an understanding of how the mind developed
and evolved. The Modern Synthesis—the evolutionary theory
to which EP is entirely wed—almost exclusively invokes nat-
ural (including kin and sexual) selection as the driving force,
genetic mutations as the creative force and genetic transmission
as the only mechanism of heredity. When applied to cognition,
the Modern Synthesis invites the decomposition of the mind
into separately evolved cognitive traits, called mental modules,
each selected to solve a particular evolutionary problem in the
human ancestor’s “environment of evolutionary adaptedness”
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). The origin of these modules is
explained with the appearance of certain genetic factors that code
for them. Strictly speaking the modern synthesis can be under-
stood as a theory of genes, which arguably is poorly equipped
to provide a more fully-fledged explanation of the transforma-
tion of form, other than the occurrence of genetic mutations
and recombinations, which somehow translate into phenotypic
modifications.
There is, however, a growing consensus that we need explana-
tory resources that go beyond inner logical representations or
the dynamics of neural networks on the on hand, and the
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received view of evolution on the other. Physical, social and cul-
tural life transforms individual characteristics and abilities in
daily interactions, during individual development and the evo-
lution of the lineage. The view of organisms, especially humans
as deeply integrated beings embedded in and transformed by
their genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, ecological, socio-cultural
and cognitive-symbolic legacies calls for an “extended evolution-
ary synthesis” (Pigliucci, 2007, 2009; Pigliucci and Müller, 2010)
that goes beyond either a theory of genes juxtaposed against a
theory of cultural evolution or more sophisticated theories of
gene-culture coevolution and niche construction. Environments,
particularly in the form of developmental environments, do not
just select for variation, they also create new variation by influenc-
ing development through the reliable transmission of non-genetic
but heritable information (Piaget, 1978; Gilbert and Epel, 2009;
Stotz, 2010; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). Organisms, and humans
in particular, are actively engaged with and manipulate their
physical and social environment and that of their descendants,
which in turn not only participates in the production of selec-
tion pressures, but almost more importantly in the production
of heritable phenotypic variation; therefore organisms actively
contribute to their own evolution. There is a strong intercon-
nection between be highly embodied, embedded and extended
cognitive systems and the kind of developmental and evolu-
tionary processes that bring them about (Sterelny, 2010; Stotz,
2010).
The next section will explore the alternative views of evolu-
tionary theory that provide much richer explanatory resources
for (evolutionary) psychology. It will probe which updates to
the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory would be needed
for its most fruitful application to problems in psychology. The
next two sections will explore in more detail two issues that
are of particular importance for psychology. Section Beyond
Innate and Learned: the Concept of Experience criticizes the
conceptual poverty created by the simplistic dichotomy between
innate or genetically determined development and acquired
learning. It introduces another concept, experience, as a step to
bridge between and integrate development and learning. Section
Extended Inheritance discusses in more detail the diverse mech-
anisms of non-genetic inheritance that comprise the central
extension to the Modern Synthesis.
The alternative conceptions of mind and cognitions to the tra-
ditional cognitivist and computationist approach, namely 4E cog-
nition, will stand at the center of Section Embodied, Embedded,
Enacted and Extended Organisms, Extended Synthesis and
Extended Evolutionary Psychology. In this final section I look in
more detail at how this alternative view of the mind is related to
the extended view of evolution that I have promoted here, par-
ticularly those parts of the new synthesis that I deem to have
special explanatory potential for many areas of psychology. A
radically different perspective to the view that sees a disembod-
ied mind being passively molded by natural selection and genetic
mutations is presented. It conceives living beings as non-linearly
coupled organism-environment systems, that come with cellular,
social, ecological and cultural legacies bequeathed to them from
earlier generations, and who’s actions substantially influence the
evolutionary process.
TOWARD AN EXTENDED EVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS
KINDS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
This section doesn’t attempt to review, discuss and criticize in
detail the main kinds of evolutionary psychology. There is an
extraordinary amount of literature out there doing just that.
This presents just a minimalist overview, and as such necessar-
ily presents a bit of a caricature, the three waves of attempts
to integrate psychology with evolutionary theory in the last
four decades. In the seventies Edward O. Wilson attempted a
“New Synthesis” under the name of Sociobiology, which viewed
social behavior as the product of evolution and therefore rea-
soned that it should be explained in terms of adaptive success.
Its arguably quite radical gene centrism, promoted particularly
through Richard Dawkins’ notion of the selfish gene, became the
subject of intense criticism. Not entirely without intellectual con-
nections, the nineties saw the emergence of the Santa Barbara
school of Evolutionary Psychology. It applies knowledge and prin-
ciples from mainstream evolutionary theory to psychology and
“good old-fashioned” Artificial Intelligence/cognitive science in
order to understand the design of the human mind: “In this view,
the mind is a set of information-processing machines that were
designed by natural selection to solve adaptive problems faced
by our hunter-gatherer ancestors” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997).
This highly successful new field attracted a large number of fol-
lowers over the years, but at the same time has been subjected
to very vocal criticisms. Against EP’s dismissal of the critics as
politically motivated anti-evolutionists, many critics were biol-
ogists, philosophers of biology and psychologists motivated by
a different vision of a more scientifically rigorous and a more
sophisticated evolutionary psychology (see for instance Barrett
et al., 2014).
The beginning of the century saw the appearance of evolution-
ary developmental psychology, applying evolutionary thinking
to human developmental psychology: “Evolutionary develop-
mental psychology is the study of the genetic and ecological
mechanisms that govern the development of social and cogni-
tive competencies common to all human beings and the epige-
netic (gene-environment interactions) processes that adapt these
competencies to local conditions” (Geary and Bjorklund, 2000,
p. 57). This new field takes its inspiration from evolutionary
developmental biology and so-called epigenetic theories of evo-
lution going back to Gilbert Gottlieb in accepting a role for
development, particularly developmental plasticity, in evolution
(Bjorklund, 2006).
Which kind of evolutionary theory you apply matters deeply
to which kind of (evolutionary) psychology you get. Therefore
what follows will be a very short analysis of which kind of amend-
ments or extensions should be included to widen the scope of
problems that can be successfully addressed by evolutionary the-
ory. Again, I have to refer to the cited literature for a much more
thorough and detailed criticism and further amendment than
I could present here; the present paper focuses on those new
developments that in my view are most relevant for an extended
evolutionary psychology.
This section asks what are the implications of recent sci-
entific developments for the mechanisms of evolution. These
developments include discoveries in molecular genetics, notably
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“molecular epigenesist” or “distributed specificity” of gene prod-
ucts, new discoveries of exogenetic heredity, and the revival of
notions of epigenesis and developmental plasticity and their
implications for evolution. Together with many others I have
argued that these developments necessitate an extension of the
conventional, neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, the so-called
“Modern Synthesis.” Some may argue that the referral to the
Modern Synthesis presents something like a straw man argument
because many practitioners have, in the intervening decades,
assimilated new conceptual and methodological developments
into their thinking, often perhaps without being aware to what
extent some of these violate the underlying assumptions on
which the original synthesis was based. Several of these assump-
tions are now more than three quarters of a century old, and
many of the relevant theories and concepts have undergone
major revisions. So the point of the call for an “extended syn-
thesis” may be as much to think through the implications of
changes that have occurred or are occurring as to call for more
change (Pigliucci, 2007, 2009; Craig, 2010; Pigliucci and Müller,
2010; Stotz, 2010; Gissis and Jablonka, 2011; Griffiths and Stotz,
2013).
MOLECULAR EPIGENESIS
As stated above, the Modern Synthesis was in its core a theory
of genes, but the gene that figures in it was the classical gene of
Gregor Mendel and Thomas Hunt Morgan, a theoretical entity of
heritable factors that permitted practitioners the “genetic analy-
sis” of observed inheritance patterns. The knowledge of how genes
conferred specificity within an organism and hence had observ-
able phenotypic effects wasn’t yet a molecular reality. Historians
of molecular biology credit Francis Crick with having supple-
mented the existing idea of stereochemical specificity, embodied
in the three-dimensional structure of biomolecules and underly-
ing the well-known lock-and-key model of interaction between
biomolecules, with the idea of informational specificity, embodied
in the linear structure of nucleic acids (such as genes and other
genetic elements) that determine the linear structure of a gene
product (Sarkar, 1996). This idea is present in Crick’s statements
of his Sequence Hypothesis and the Central Dogma:
• The Sequence Hypothesis . . . In its simplest form it assumes that
the specificity of a piece of nucleic acid is expressed solely by
the sequence of its bases, and that this sequence is a (simple)
code for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein.
• The Central Dogma This states that once “information” has
passed into a protein it cannot get out again. In more detail,
the transfer of information from nucleic acid to protein may be
possible, but transfer from protein to protein, or from protein
to nucleic acid is impossible. Information means here the pre-
cise determination of sequence, either of bases in the nucleic
acid or of amino-acid residues in the protein. (Crick, 1958,
pp. 152–153, italics in original).
Griffiths and Stotz (2013) have termed this encoding of speci-
ficity “Crick information.” If a cause makes a specific difference
to the order of elements in a biomolecule, it contains Crick infor-
mation for that molecule. This definition embodies the essential
idea of Crick’s sequence hypothesis, without in principle limiting
the location of biological information to nucleic acid sequences
as Crick does. An important idea behind Crick information is
that this causally grounded notion of biological information can
be extended to apply to factors other than DNA, using research
results from molecular biology. Crick’s Sequence Hypothesis and
Central Dogma were based on a very simple picture of how
the specificity of bio-molecules is encoded in living cells. We
now know that, at least in eukaryotes, coding regions are sur-
rounded by a large number of non-coding sequences that regulate
gene expression. The discrepancy between the number of cod-
ing sequences and the sometimes vastly higher number of gene
products leads to the insight that the informational specificity in
coding regions of DNAmust be amplified by other bio-molecules
in order to specify the whole range of products. Different mech-
anisms of gene regulation together co-specify the final product
of the gene in question, first by activating the gene so it can
get transcribed, second by selecting a chosen subset of the entire
coding sequence (alternative splicing), and thirdly by creating
new sequence information through the insertion, deletion or
exchange of single nucleotide letters of the RNA message (RNA
editing). Thus specificity, and hence Crick information, is dis-
tributed between a myriad of factors other than the original
coding sequence: Non-coding DNA sequences with regulatory
functions, diverse gene products such as transcription, splicing
and editing factors (usually proteins), and non-coding RNAs
(Stotz, 2006a,b). This leads to the second substantive use of
information in contemporary molecular biology, namely in rep-
resentations of genomic regulatory networks (GRNs) as imple-
menting computations (Kauffman, 1969; Davidson and Levine,
2005).
Specificity turns out to be not inherent in any single
biomolecule in these large networks but induced by regulated
recruitment and combinatorial control (Ptashne and Gann,
2002). And it is here that we will find that the networks can-
not be reduced to DNA sequences and gene products, because
many of the latter need to be recruited, activated or transported
to render them functional. These processes, the recruitment, acti-
vation, location or transportation of transcription, splicing and
editing factors, allow the environment to have very specific effects
on gene expression. I believe that this is a way to give a more
precise meaning to the distinction between “instructive vs. per-
missive environmental causes” (Gilbert, 2003; Gilbert and Epel,
2009). Many regulatory gene products serve to relay environ-
mental (Crick) information to the genome. While in embryology
and morphogenesis it is often acknowledged that environmen-
tal signals play a role in the organization of global activities; they
are rarely seen to carry information for the precise determina-
tion of the nucleic acid or amino acid chains in gene products.
But this is precisely what occurs. Not just morphogenesis at
higher levels of organization, but even the determination of
the primary sequence of gene products is a creative process of
“molecular epigenesist” that cannot be reduced to the informa-
tion encoded in the genome alone (Stotz, 2006b; Griffiths and
Stotz, 2013).
Section Beyond Innate and Learned: the Concept of
Experience will argue that these developments warrant
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 908 | 3
Stotz Extended evolutionary psychology
the introduction of another concept in psychology, namely
“experience,” beside the concepts of development and learn-
ing, to accommodate the many different avenues by which an
organism reacts to and interacts with the environment.
NON-GENETIC INHERITANCE
Evolution is defined as changes in gene frequencies, because only
the base sequence was deemed hereditary. The idea that devel-
opmental outcomes could be transmitted to the next generation
was for almost a century discredited as raising the specter of
Lamarckism. The molecular discoveries of epigenetic mecha-
nisms, which produce effects on gene expression that were not
just heritable from one cell to the other but in certain cases also
from parent germline to offspring germline, however, have ren-
dered ideas of non-genetic or exogenetic inheritance respectable.
Parents beget their children not just gene sequences but also
instructions over gene expression and other functional states. In
addition, many aspects of the environment and individual expe-
riences of a developing organism are there by evolutionary design:
“genes inherit a rich and supportive environment, a fact few dis-
pute but few discuss with any urgency” (West and King, 1987,
p. 552, italics added). Evolution has designed not only a reac-
tive genome, but also a “developmental niche” co-constructed
by the parental and offspring generations to which the genome
reacts to reconstruct life-cycles (see Section Developmental Niche
Construction).
Since the development of molecular epigenetics has brought
the existence of exogenetic inheritance to the attention of a
much larger field, the idea is slowly gaining wider acceptance.
The main points of debate today concern the scope and poten-
tial mechanisms of transgenerational transfer of non-genetic
information, and its importance for evolutionary dynamics.
Epigenetic inheritance proper, transmitted through the germline,
and behaviorally transmitted transgenerational epigenetic effects
(see Section Extended Inheritance) differ in several important
ways from genetic inheritance: epigenetic variations may be less
stable, because these variations are in principle reversible, and
many organisms have developed safeguards against their trans-
generational transmission. These features are not necessarily a
disadvantage: in comparison to genetic inheritance, epigenetic
mechanisms are more sensitive to the environment, which might
make them more directed, more predictable, and also more
flexible. These are all features which potentially render them
more adaptive in the short term than blind genetic variation,
particularly in variable environmental conditions (Jablonka and
Lamb, 1995; Holliday, 2006). Exogenetic inheritance systems
often transfer information involved in ‘adaptive transgenera-
tional plasticity’ (see Section Transgenerational Developmental
Plasticity: Parental Effects):
. . . because the parental phenotype responds to some aspect of
its environment that correlates with a feature that is of adap-
tive relevance to the offspring. This correlational information can
be exploited by developmental processes because of the continu-
ity between parental and offspring phenotypes (. . .). In genetic
inheritance systems, on the other hand, correlational informa-
tion requires a process of selection that builds up gene frequency
differences between environments. (Uller, 2012).
DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY AND EVOLUTION
There are now a variety of scientific fields interested in the extent
to which development influences evolution, and the ideas about
which mechanisms are evolutionarily relevant differ greatly: The
most radical position asserts that environmentally induced and
developmentally regulated variation in exogenetic, developmen-
tal resources may be transmitted directly to the next generation
either from germ or soma cell to germ cell, or from soma to soma,
in order to create heritable variation in the phenotype (Griffiths
and Gray, 1994; Jablonka and Lamb, 1995, 2005; Stotz, 2008,
2010; Stotz and Allen, 2008; Badyaev and Uller, 2009; Gilbert
and Epel, 2009; Danchin et al., 2011; Bonduriansky, 2012; Uller,
2012).
Some biologists insist that only epigenetic inheritance trans-
mitted through the gametes should be called a proper inher-
itance system, while the transmission from soma to germline
or soma to soma is described as “transgenerational epigenetic
effects” (Youngson and Whitelaw, 2008). Bonduriansky (2012)
has argued that this resistance stems from the forceful association
between genes and biological inheritance created by transmission
genetics. For others less impressed by those historical develop-
ments transgenerational epigenetic effects are parental effects
mediated via epigenetic mechanisms, which fall under the behav-
ioral inheritance system (e.g., Meaney, 2001; Danchin et al., 2011;
Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). Some evolutionary developmental
biologists, traditionally reluctant to accept the existence of non-
genetic inheritance, now embrace the importance of epigenetics
for evolution, but see it as an extension of the genetic inheri-
tance system since it works via the modification of the chromatin
system, which forms part of the chromosome (Hallgrimsson and
Hall, 2011).
According to others, phenotypically plastic responses during
the lifetime (phenotypic accommodation) may uncover the exis-
tence, or facilitate the production, of suitable genetic change.
Such genetic variation may lead via natural selection to either
genetic assimilation (also known as the Baldwin effect), or genetic
accommodation, in other words the genetic inheritance of either
decreased or increased responsiveness to environmental condi-
tions (Waddington, 1953a,b; West-Eberhard, 2003). Others argue
that a group of conserved core processes of organisms facili-
tate the generation of phenotypic variation out of underlying
genetic variation, called “facilitated variation” (Kirschner and
Gerhart, 2010). Approaches closely related to the idea of facil-
itated variation maintain that evolution should be understood
as a succession of developmental life cycles rather than change
in gene frequencies, and it is therefore developmental mecha-
nisms that provide the necessary causal explanations for how
genetic change translates into phenotypic modifications (Hall,
1999).
Lastly, there are those within the niche construction (Odling-
Smee et al., 2003) and the gene-culture coevolution approaches
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985) who maintain that individual
behavior and hence development influences evolution mainly
by affecting the future selection pressure of the population
through ecological and cultural niche construction activities.
These modified selection pressures then feed back to evolutionary
processes.
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SUMMARY
The most important difference between the received view and an
extended synthesis as conceived here is the acceptance of inheri-
tance as a much wider phenomenon than originally understood.
Inheritance is hence defined as the parental transfer to the next
generation of all the developmental resources, including but not
limited to DNA, that permit the reconstruction and modifica-
tion of the developmental system. This developmental system is
the whole organism-developmental niche complex. This recon-
struction and modification encompasses both developmentally
entrenched effects as well as sources for the expression of novel
phenotypic variation, a case of potentially adaptive transgener-
ational plasticity. Some parental effects (see below) enable the
persistence and even the spread of the induced phenotype by
modifying selection pressure (e.g., when parental resources such
as protection contribute to the offspring’s ability to survive and
reproduce).
So, while many still argue to what extent the transference of
non-genetic resources influences population dynamics and the
rate and direction of phenotypic evolution, here I want to advo-
cate to want to advocate the extent to which it can provide
more adequate answers to a wide range of central evolutionary
questions (questions modified from Pigliucci and Kaplan, 2006).
These include the:
a. Origin of novel traits: adaptive transgenerational plasticity.
b. Modification of traits: environmentally induced variability via
parental effects.
c. Spread of traits: the co-construction of a selective environment
by developmental systems (selective niche construction).
d. Maintenance of traits: stabilization of the developmental and
selective niche.
e. Reliable (re)production of traits: entrenched extended inher-
itance mechanisms (developmental niche construction)
(compare Stotz, 2010).
BEYOND INNATE AND LEARNED: THE CONCEPT OF
EXPERIENCE
Section Extended Inheritance will look in more detail at a range
of mechanisms of, and fields of research into, non-genetic inheri-
tance, in particular epigenetic inheritance both in its narrow and
wider meaning, parental effects on offspring phenotype, and the
idea of the developmental niche, which is constructed by these
processes.
But before that, the root of some conceptual shortcomings
in psychology—and beyond—needs to be addressed. This is the
conceptual poverty expressed in the commonsense distinction
between the innate and the acquired, usually decoded as caused
by genes vs. being the product of learning (see Stotz and Allen,
2012 for a more detailed analysis of this problem). Unlike in biol-
ogy, in wide areas of psychology the process of learning, instead of
being understood as part and parcel of behavioral development,
is set against the maturational, preprogrammed unfolding of the
young to the adult.
A clarification of the relationship between the concepts of
learning and development in psychology will require a biologically
informed psychology, and the formulation of a broadened concept
of “experience” may help to bridge the gap between learning and
development by including all aspects of environmental stimuli
that lead to long-term adaptive changes of behavior, including
“learning” in its usual narrower sense. In other words, the concept
of experience is not limited to sensory processing but includes a
quite heterogeneous mix of environmental resources influencing
the system’s behavior. While this concept is not new, it unfortu-
nately is not commonly used in scientific investigations, other
than in its fields of origin (early comparative psychology and
developmental psychobiology). My understanding of experience
follows its original definition by the American animal psycholo-
gist Theodore Christian Schneirla, quoted by his student Daniel
Lehrman: “Experience is ‘the contribution to development of the
effects of stimulation from all available sources (external and
internal), including their functional trace effects surviving from
earlier development’ (Schneirla, 1957). Within this wide range of
processes learning is only a relatively small part” (Lehrman, 1970,
p. 30). To take this really on board one needs to acknowledge that
physiological regulation and the regulation of behavior cannot be
sharply separated, since their underlying mechanisms do not nec-
essarily belong to distinctly different classes. This is especially so
in early development. Reintroducing the concept of experience
is not another way of saying that all behavior is learned, but a
vehicle to bring home the inadequacy of the distinction between
innate and acquired. It implicitly questions why “instinct” and
“learning” should be the only two choices available to us for
understanding behavioral development. A necessary requisite for
the integration of the concepts of learning and development is
to understand development as proposed by the developmental
systems theory (Oyama et al., 2001).
The last decade has witnessed enormous scientific advances in
genomics, systems biology, social neuroscience, evolutionary, and
ecological and developmental biology (“evo-devo,” “eco-devo,”
phenotypic plasticity, niche construction, extra-genetic inher-
itance, developmental systems theory). They challenge overly
gene-centered and pre-deterministic as well as environmentalist
explanations of behavior. Nature and nurture don’t interact as if
they were separated entities, with nature as the a priori plan being
separated from concrete living and nurture being the means for
modifying nature’s plan through experience. Instead, every trait
develops out of the nonlinear interaction between a range of very
diverse developmental resources that cannot be usefully divided
into genetic and non-genetic resources. It starts with the envi-
ronmental regulation of gene expression, goes over a range of
experiences beneath the skin and above the gene, over stages of
sensory and social learning in vertebrates, to the exquisitely sen-
sitive learning capacities of the human brain. “Nurture” is this
ongoing process of development, while “nature” is the natural
outcome of the organism-environment-system (Oyama, 1999).
Do we find learning or cognition in bacteria? The answer
depends verymuch on your definition of learning and experience.
Possibly yes, if “environment” is understood as the source of a
“quite heterogeneous mix of resources called experience” (Moore,
2003, p. 350) extracted by a wide variety of means, only one of
which is sensory, and if means for behavior derive frommore than
what is known to the senses. The concept of bacterial learning
is no mere philosophical abstraction because of the many shared
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molecular pathways, often down to prokaryotes. For example, the
NMDA receptors involved in the synaptic plasticity of neurons use
proteins for binding amino acids that are highly conserved from
bacteria (Kuryatov et al., 1994).
The study of behavior and cognition looks at three intercon-
nected time-scales: evolution, development, and situated behav-
ior. The integration of the first two seems possible now, and there
are successful attempts at integrating the second two in areas of
psychology, namely developmental psychobiology and social neu-
roscience (Michel and Moore, 1995; Cacioppo et al., 2002). This
integration is based on an essential role for biology in psychol-
ogy. From a psychobiological perspective, learning appears as a
category within an overall framework of development as the life-
long, adaptive construction of the phenotype in its environment.
Taking the idea of phenotypic plasticity seriously could, on the
other hand, lead to a conception of development as a lifelong pro-
cess of “learning” or “acquiring” an adaptive mode of living in a
partially constructed environment.
EXTENDED INHERITANCE
MECHANISMS OF TRANSMISSIONS: FOUR INHERITANCE SYSTEMS
Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb propelled the idea of epi-
genetic inheritance to prominence with their provocative title
Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimension
(Jablonka and Lamb, 1995). Epigenetic inheritance in this context
is used primarily in its narrow sense as the inheritance of cellu-
lar functional states via structural elements (e.g., membranes),
steady-state systems (self-perpetuating metabolic patterns), and
chromatin modification (chemical modifications of histone pro-
teins or DNA bases), although it often spills over into a broader
sense to include other exogenetic inheritance systems. Jablonka
and Lamb’s identification of epigenetic inheritance with the
inheritance of acquired characters is not unproblematic. Some
scientists insist that the term Lamarckian inheritance should be
restricted to the inheritance of phenotypic (somatic) characters
that are acquired during development (Hall, 2011, p. 11). It would
also entail a directed response to the environment, not just blindly
caused by it. While strict epigenetic inheritance is transmitted
through the germline, it is often mixed up with “experience-
dependent epigenetic inheritance” (Danchin et al., 2011) in the
broader sense, which should really be understood as behavioral
and ecological inheritance mediated by epigenetic effects. As said
above, the latter form has also been termed transgenerational
epigenetic effects (Youngson and Whitelaw, 2008). The problem
may often be that the exact underlying mechanism for a parental
effect is not yet known. Epigenetic inheritance of the latter kind
may also have distinctive evolutionary advantages. Particularly
the parental effect literature offers a wide range of examples where
parental effects, that work later in development and are mediated
by the latter kind of epigenetic effects, enable the development of
functional phenotypes in the offspring (Uller, 2012).
Some molecular biologists have argued that one should speak
of epigenetic inheritance in the literal sense only in those cases
when the methylation pattern is transmitted unchanged over sev-
eral generations (Wilkins, 2011, p. 391). Some cases certainly
meet this criterion. In a comprehensive review of epigenetic
inheritance Jablonka and Raz conclude that it is ubiquitous, and
can show stability of transmission of up to 3 generations in
humans and up to 8 generations in other animal taxa, while
plants can have a very stable epigenetic transmission (Jablonka
and Raz, 2009). Many cases, however, would indeed not meet the
criterion of multi-generational transmission. Epigenetic signals
are very sensitive to environmental factors in that they are first
“established by transiently expressed or transiently activated fac-
tors that respond to environmental stimuli, developmental cues,
or internal events” (Bonasio et al., 2010, p. 613). That doesn’t
mean that we should accept the criterion of multi-generational
stability. Several hypotheses about the evolutionary origins of epi-
genetic inheritance stress its value in spatially and temporally
heterogenous environments, where it allows rapid responses to
change. It is simply not correct that epigenetic change will only
affect evolution if the changes themselves persist for more than
one generation. Parental effects researchers have long known that
one-generation parental effects substantially alter the dynamics of
evolutionarymodels by changing which equilibrium a population
will evolve to (Wade, 1998). In conventional quantitative genetics,
the importance of Mendelism is not that individual genes can be
tracked from one generation to the next—quantitative genetics
does not do this—but that Mendelian assumptions let us work
out what phenotypes (and hence their fitness) will appear in the
next generation as a function of the phenotypes in the last gener-
ation. Epigenetic inheritance changes that mapping from parent
to offspring, and this will affect evolution. There is no more cen-
tral instance of the study of heredity than quantitative genetics,
so more argument is needed for why epigenetic inheritance needs
to be stable for several generations to be regarded as a form of
heredity.
As I mentioned above, discussion of epigenetic inheritance
often spills over from discussion of the specific phenomena of
meiotic inheritance of chromatin modifications to include other
phenomena that produce a parental effect. This is understandable,
because molecular epigenetic mechanisms are often important in
parental effects that do not involve actual epigenetic inheritance.
For example, in one well-studied example, epigenetic mecha-
nisms have been shown to mediate the transgenerational effect
of maternal care in rats without actual epigenetic inheritance.
Maternal behavior establishes stable patterns of methylation in
the pups. These affect brain development and the behavior of
the next generation of mother rats. While the behavior of those
mothers reestablishes the patterns of methylation, they are not
inherited through the germline (Meaney, 2001; Champagne and
Curley, 2009). So long as the environment is constant, or the
epigenetic pattern is maintained throughout the lifetime of the
parent and reliably programs parental behavior, the phenotype
will remain constant through many generations. The authors
call this environmental programming of certain types of behav-
ior through DNA methylation “life at the interface between a
dynamic environment and a fixed genome” (Meaney and Szyf,
2005).
In a recent book, Jablonka and Lamb have attempted to orga-
nize the topic of epigenetic inheritance in this wider sense around
four “dimensions” of heredity: Genetic, Epigenetic, Ecological,
Behavioral and Cultural, and Symbolic (Jablonka and Lamb,
2005). The Genetic Inheritance System comprises protein coding
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and non-coding RNA genes plus the regulatory motifs in the
genome, as well as sequences with unknown functions. The
Epigenetic Inheritance System includes modifications of DNA
and chromatin, which are part of the nucleus. Beside these
resources that are literally physically attached to the genome
other developmental resources are transmitted through the cyto-
plasm of the egg, such as parental gene products (regulatory
proteins and non-coding RNAs). The cortical inheritance sys-
tem consists of cellular structures such as organelles with their
own membranes and genes (mitochondria and chloroplasts),
membrane-free organelles (ribosomes and the Golgi appara-
tus), and the cellular membrane systems. Most of these struc-
tures cannot be produced from genetic information alone but
act as templates for themselves. A Behavioral (plus cultural
and ecological) Inheritance System forms a third dimension, in
which information is transmitted through behavior-influencing
substances, non-imitative and imitative social learning, as well
as habitat construction, food provisioning, and other parental
effects like that described in the last paragraph. The Symbolic
(plus the Cognitive) Inheritance System forms the last dimen-
sion. Offspring inherit social structures and rules, cultural tradi-
tions and institutions, and technologies. This inheritance system
importantly includes epistemic tools, such as language, com-
petent adults, teaching techniques etc. (compare Jablonka and
Lamb, 2005). All systems use different mechanisms of transmis-
sion and show changing degrees of fidelity. Some mechanisms
may not be intrinsically stable. The nuclear genetic inheritance
system, for example, relies on several layers of proof reading and
copy-error detection systems for its exceptionally high fidelity.
A suitable mechanism of scaffolding can lend the transmission
mechanism reliability: proof reading supports genetic inheri-
tance, epigenetics stabilizes gene expression. Learning is scaf-
folded by teaching or by the reliable affordances of stimuli “that
define what is available to be learned . . . (and) . . . function to
channel malleability into stable trajectories” (West et al., 2003,
p. 618).
As already mentioned, apart from its quite clearly defined
molecular sense, epigenetic inheritance can also mean something
much more general and much less clearly delineated. This other
meaning derives in part from Waddington’s original understand-
ing of epigenetics, but also tries to integrate newer developments
and understanding:
Epigenetics . . . focuses on the general organizational principles
of developmental systems, on the phenotypic accommodation
processes underlying plasticity and canalization, on differentia-
tion and cellular heredity, on learning and memory mechanisms.
Epigenetics includes the study of the transmission to subse-
quent generations of developmentally-derived differences between
individuals, thereby acknowledging the developmental aspect of
heredity. (Jablonka, pers. comm., cited in Gottlieb, 2001).
TRANSGENERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY: PARENTAL
EFFECTS
Amongst the oldest of the research agendas investigating pro-
cesses of transgenerational transmission of nongenetic resources
is work on “parental effects.” As its name suggests work of this
sort does not start from findings about underlying mechanisms.
Instead, it begins with the relationship between parent and off-
spring phenotypes. Parental effects are sustained influences on
offspring phenotype that are derived from the parental pheno-
type beyond the nuclear genes bequeathed to the offspring. The
parental phenotype is the result of genetic, environmental and
(grand-) parental effects, and their interaction. More formally,
we can say that a parental effect is a correlation between off-
spring and parent phenotypes that is statistically independent of
the correlation between their genotypes.
Parental effects are received as part of the environmental com-
ponent of offspring phenotypes. The environment provided by
the mother for her offspring is a very important factor in causing
fitness differences among newborns and weanlings, particularly
in organisms with extensive parental care. In environmentally
induced parental effects the environment experienced by the
parental generation influences the phenotype of the offspring. In
locusts, an environment overcrowded with conspecifics experi-
enced by the mother causes her to coat her eggs with a hormonal
substance containing serotonin, which induces the egg to develop
into a high-density morph with wings and legs suitable for migra-
tion. Many parental effects, like this one, enhance the offspring’s
fitness. Natural selection has shaped offspring to respond to sub-
tle variations in parental behaviors or parental provisioning as
a forecast of the environmental conditions they will ultimately
face after independence from the parent (Mousseau and Fox,
1998; Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009). The organism’s develop-
mental plasticity utilizes environmental cues or developmental
resources inherited from the parents to fine-tune its phenotype
to the current or expected environment.
Because parental effects are defined phenomenologically—
an observable relationship between phenotypes, any mechanism
that produces this relationship counts as a parental effect. The
domain of phenomena called parental effects includes narrow-
sense epigenetic effects that are reproduced in meiosis and
thus can pass from one generation to another, but it includes
many other things as well. The mechanisms that can create a
parental effect include: parental gene products (mRNAs, ncR-
NAs, proteins); cytoplasmic inheritance (mitochondria, plastids,
membranes, signaling factors, chemical gradients, intra-cellular
symbionts; often investigated separately as maternal inheritance);
oviposition (the placement of eggs in insects, fish, and reptiles
can effect food availability and quality, temperature and light
conditions, and protection against predators and other adverse
conditions, and hence has important consequences for the fit-
ness of the offspring); gut organisms (which are often neces-
sary for the normal development of intestines and the immune
system, and daily metabolism); sex determination (via mater-
nal influence on temperature exposure in reptiles, hormonal
influence on gamete selection in birds); nutritional provisioning
(prenatally through seeds, eggs, and placenta, postnatal feeding
particularly in mammals and birds, that not only provides sus-
tenance for the offspring but influences later food preferences,
feeding behavior, and metabolism); parental care and rearing
practices (warmth, protection, and emotional attachment, e.g.,
differential licking in rats, teaching and learning); social status
(in hierarchically organized mammals, such as primates, off-
spring often inherit the social status of the mother), among other
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things (Mousseau and Fox, 1998; Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009).
Although most of these phenomena do not count as narrow-
sense epigenetic inheritance, because they do not involve the
transfer of chromatin modifications through meiosis, the phrase
“epigenetic inheritance” is sometimes used in a wide sense that
is more or less equivalent to parental effects. The reason is
that they often assert their effect on the phenotype via epige-
netic mechanisms caused by the maternal phenotype. I prefer to
use the less ambiguous phrase exogenetic inheritance in those
contexts where the exact underlying mechanisms are not yet
known.
As might be expected from such a diverse field, there are
many different approaches to parental effects. Parental effects
researchers Badyaev and Uller (2009) have shown how the differ-
ences in the ways parental effects are understood reflect the differ-
ent roles they play in research. These different approaches do not
necessarily count exactly the same phenomena as parental effects.
For many geneticists it is essentially a statistical concept, i.e., an
additional parent-offspring correlation that must be added to a
quantitative genetic model in order to correctly predict the effects
of selection. In contrast, someone studying animal development is
likely to define parental effects at a mechanistic level, referring to
specific ways in which they are produced. Evolutionary biologists
see parental effects either as adaptations for phenotypic plasticity,
or as the consequence of a conflict between parent and offspring
seeking to influence each other’s phenotype to suit their own
interests:
. . . parental effects mean different things to different biologists—
from developmental induction of novel phenotypic variation to an
evolved adaptation, and from epigenetic transference of essential
developmental resources to a stage of inheritance and ecological
succession. (Badyaev and Uller, 2009, p. 1169).
I suggest that the distinctive feature of parental effects is that it
is a phenomenological concept. So parental effects should not
be defined by any specific mechanism that brings them about.
Second, parental effects should not be defined as adaptations,
since their evolutionary significance does not depend on this—
the correlations have the same impact on the dynamics of evolu-
tion whether or not they are adaptations. From a developmental
perspective, parental effects need to be understood before the
difficult question of their evolutionary origins can be properly
addressed. More importantly, non-genetically inherited resources
shouldn’t be understood as competing with genetic resources;
they complement them. They do this in part by amplifying the
sequence information encoded by nucleic acids, as summarized
by the idea of molecular epigenesis. Badyaev and Uller summarize
the significance of parental effects in development and evolution
very nicely:
Here, we suggest that by emphasizing the complexity of causes
and influences in developmental systems and by making explicit
the links between development, natural selection and inheri-
tance, the study of parental effects enables deeper understand-
ing of developmental dynamics of life cycles and provides a
unique opportunity to explicitly integrate development and evo-
lution. . . .parental effects on development enable evolution by
natural selection by reliably transferring developmental resources
needed to reconstruct, maintain and modify genetically inher-
ited components of the phenotype. The view of parental effects
as an essential and dynamic part of an evolutionary contin-
uum unifies mechanisms behind the origination, modification
and historical persistence of organismal form and function,
and thus brings us closer to a more realistic understanding
of life’s complexity and diversity (Badyaev and Uller, 2009,
p. 1169).
DEVELOPMENTAL NICHE CONSTRUCTION
The concept of the ontogenetic niche was introduced in 1987
by developmental psychobiologists Meredith West and Andrew
King. It provides a way to bring together the research agendas
described above that focus on exogenetic inheritance mecha-
nisms in the widest sense. Many aspects of the environment
and experience of a developing organism are there by design:
Evolution has designed not only a reactive genome, but also a
developmental niche that reacts with it to construct phenotypes.
West and King define the ontogenetic niche as a set of ecolog-
ical and social circumstances inherited by organisms (West and
King, 1987, p. 550). One should add epigenetic, epistemic, cul-
tural, and symbolic legacies to this list and point to Jablonka
and Lamb’s “dimensions” of heredity as a thorough and princi-
pled effort to taxonomize the contents of the developmental niche
(Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Stotz, 2006c, 2008, 2010; Griffiths and
Stotz, 2013). Naturally, some dimensions are more prominent in
one taxon than another. Together, these legacies are designed to
provide the developmental resources needed to reconstruct and
modify the life-cycle in each generation. The developing organ-
ism can expect to encounter this niche in development as reliably
as it does its genome: “It’s the dependability of the niche in deliv-
ering certain resources to the young that makes it a legacy” (West
et al., 1988, p. 46).
The developmental niche provides an alternative to the nature-
nurture dichotomy (Stotz, 2008; West and King, 2008). The niche
equals nurture since it nurtures the developing organism, and it
equals nature (traditionally understood as the innate), because
it is part of the organism’s endowment. West and King and
their collaborators devoted decades of painstaking research to
the acquisition of species-typical behavior of the Brown-headed
Cowbird. As a nest parasite the cowbird had been assumed, since
it could not learn species-specific behaviors from its parents, to
inherit those behaviors genetically: they are innate. West and King
set out to show that this kind of dichotomous thinking was no
substitute for a causal analysis of how the phenotypes actually
develop. The results of this research led them to develop the
“ontogenetic niche” concept. The ability of cowbirds to recog-
nize their own species visually depends, amongst other factors, on
“phenotype matching”—individuals seek to interact with birds
that look like themselves. This, in combination to ecological fac-
tors, helps ensure that cowbirds find themselves in flocks. Male
song is shaped by feedback from female cowbirds, whose wing
stroking and gaping displays in response to the songs strongly
reinforces males (West and King, 2008). Raised in isolation males
will sing, but they need feedback from a mature female audience
and also competition with other males in order to learn how to
produce cowbird songs in a way that lead to successful mating:
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In cowbirds the juvenile niche is a forum in which males learn the
pragmatics of singing, which appears to be a performatory, if not
sometimes martial, art. (West and King, 1987, p. 52).
Female song preferences are themselves socially transmitted. As a
result, cowbirds reliably transmit not only species-typical songs,
but also regional song dialects. The flock functions as an infor-
mation center, controlling what is “bioavailable” to be learned
throughout the lifespan. The developmental niche concept under-
mines the traditional dichotomy between heredity and individual
experience, since it highlights how experience, including in some
taxa real social learning, is involved in the development of species-
typical behavior. Aspects of experience are part of the mechanism
of heredity (West and King, 2008).
The cowbird is not an isolated example. Other examples in
which developmental niches afford the robust experiences neces-
sary for normal development include food and habitat imprinting
in insects through oviposition; maternal care and stimulation for
neural development (sexual behavior and fear reaction in rats;
learning disposition in chickens); territorial and habitat inher-
itance (nest sites, food resources, a hierarchy of relatives) in
woodpeckers and jays; maternal rank inheritance in carnivores
and primates (Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009).
Jeff Alberts has used the developmental niche extensively in
studies of rat development. The rat pup passes through four con-
secutive “nurturant niches” on the way to adulthood: the uterine
niche, the dam’s body, the huddle in the natal nest, and the coterie
(Alberts and Schank, 2006). They all provide sustenance for the
developing organism, such as nutrients, warmth, insulation, and
“nurture” in the form of behavioral and social stimuli as affor-
dances for development. The early ontogeny of species-typical
rat behavior is directed mainly by olfactory, but also tactile, cues
that are provided by the different ontogenetic niches. Olfactory
cues on the dam’s nipples guide the pup to them. However, the
pup’s developing sensoria need to acquire odor recognition of
the nipple through chemical cues in the amniotic fluid provided
by the uterine niche it had passed through before. The spread
of amniotic fluid over the dam’s body after birth bridges the
pre- and postnatal niches of the pup. Filial huddling preferences
in the natal niche are mediated by learned olfactory cues pro-
vided from the close proximity of the siblings during the suckling
stage. This huddle or natal niche in turn induces preferences pre-
requisite for the functioning of the rat in the social context of
the “coterie niche,” through thermotactile stimulation. Alberts
notes:
Again we find a stereotyped, species-typical, developmentally-
fixed behavior is learned, with all of the key components [. . .]
existing as natural features of the ontogenetic niche. . . . Specific
features of these niches elicit specific reactions and responses in
the developing offspring. (Alberts, 2008, p. 300).
These niches afford the pups a range of other experiences. In the
previous section we encountered Michael Meaney and collabora-
tors’ discovery that natural variation in maternal care, elicited by
experiences of the mother, influence stress responses, exploratory
and maternal care behavior in the offspring. The quality of the
mother’s licking and grooming behavior results in a cascade
of neuro-endocrine and epigenetic mechanisms. One pertinent
example is the permanent down-regulation in the expression of
the glucocorticoid receptor gene in the pup brain’s hippocampus
via the methylation of its promoters, which occurs in response to
a low-level of licking and grooming by themother (Meaney, 2001;
Champagne and Curley, 2009). This down-regulation causes high
stress-reactivity in the offspring. Hence stressful mothers in reac-
tion to an adverse environment produce stressful daughters who
in turn become stressful mothers. This is not necessarily bad,
since highly stressed individuals are better prepared to survive in
adverse environments (e.g., a high level of predation). Conversely,
relaxed mothers that show a high level of licking and grooming
produce relaxed offspring that turn into high licking mothers.
Experiences can help to construct the legacy that the next gen-
eration will receive: “Exogenetic legacies are inherited, but they
are also learned” (West et al., 1988, p. 50).
The developmental niche explains the reliable development of
species-typical features, but the framework is equally applicable
to plastic phenotypes. Many developmental systems are “designed
to be as open as ecologically possible and thus immediately sen-
sitive to ecological change” (West and King, 2008, p. 393). The
niche contains the scaffolding for normal development, but the
genome has coevolved with the niche and can also use it as
a source of information for developmentally plastic responses:
“Animals have evolved to integrate signals from the environment
into their normal developmental trajectory” (Gilbert and Epel,
2009, p. 9). The fact that development is not laid out before it
occurs, with other causal factors as merely permissive (or dis-
ruptive), but instead emerges through a process of epigenesis,
is what enables the integration of robustness and plasticity in
development (Lamm and Jablonka, 2008; Bateson andGluckman,
2011).
EMBODIED, EMBEDDED, ENACTED AND EXTENDED
ORGANISMS, EXTENDED SYNTHESIS AND EXTENDED
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
In the introduction I alluded to the interplay between the nature
of the organism and mechanisms of evolution. This section
will explore this relationship in more detail. While what kind
of mechanisms one deems central for the evolutionary process
deeply influences one’s understanding of the nature of organisms,
adopting a certain approach to the nature of life and cognition
and the relationship either between the two or between organ-
ism and environment should affect one’s view of evolutionary
theory.
One perspective views species of organisms as passively
molded by external selection working on the random muta-
tions organisms possess, with the evolutionary process pretty
much unaffected by the behavior of organisms themselves (or
so the equations at the heart of evolutionary theory, popula-
tion genetics, imply). A radically different perspective views living
beings as non-linearly coupled organism-environment systems,
whose actions substantially influence the evolutionary process via
two different pathways: the developmental creation of potentially
directed or adaptive variations, and the active construction of the
population’s niche and hence the selection pressures acting on it.
Under the latter perspective it shouldn’t matter if you start with
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a revised vision of the nature of life and cognition or a revised
vision of the nature of the mechanisms that underlie the process
of evolution. One should prescribe the other.
DISEMBODIED MINDS AND THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
The modern synthesis asserts that mutation in genes provide the
only (and, at that, blind and non-directed) variations and the
slow process of natural selection acting on these variations is its
direction-giving, order-producing or creative force. Genetic vari-
ations determine the organism’s characteristics, which in turn
influence its fitness, i.e., its ability to survive and reproduce.
Genetic inheritance renders these fitness differences hereditary.
Since evolution is defined as changes in gene frequencies, it
is implied that development, including potential developmen-
tal modifications through phenotypic plasticity or the behavior
of organisms, plays no role in this process. The causes of phe-
notypic variation, evolution’s main currency, are solely genetic:
blind mutation, sexual recombination, genetic drift and gene
flow. Additionally, natural selection is the result of hostile external
forces on populations, a “struggle for existence” which results in
the “survival of the fittest.” Both take place without any acknowl-
edged influence of the organism—with the notable exception of
sexual selection, already envisioned by Darwin as a secondary
mechanism of selection, which is greatly influenced by the choice
of an organism’s choice of sexual partners. In the seventies, ideas
of evolutionary game theory, the competition between different
genetically inherited strategies of survival and reproduction, were
added. Today we also have theories of coevolution, such as gene-
culture coevolution, and niche construction. These theories all
work by recognizing that populations influence, to some extent,
their own selection pressures. The main reason for this relative
neglect of the organism in the modern synthesis was that any
influence by the developing organism that is not originally caused
by its genetic make-up was assumed to not leave any trace effects
on its descendants. And so it comes as no surprise that the main
equations in population genetics, the formal backbone of the
modern synthesis, calculate frequency and interaction of alleles
and genes in populations, without any mention of the organism.
THE ROLE OF EMBODIED, EMBEDDED AND EXTENDED ORGANISMS IN
AN EXTENDED EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
The adapted mind of evolutionary psychology has a cognitive
foundation of innate, content-rich mental modules, supposed to
be universally shared by all humans. EP proposes that strong
selective pressures during the ancestral environment of evolu-
tionary adaptedness (EEA) have accounted for the evolution of
these faculties, shaped by environmental problems of the human’s
ancestor in the Pleistocene. They include not only sets of rules
and algorithms for problem-solving and other mental faculties,
but consist of concrete information reflecting the structure of the
real world at the time when our mental capacities were meant to
have evolved.
The alternative view of evolution as the “change in the dis-
tributions and constitution of developmental systems” does not
posit a population of static and passive entities. Instead of ran-
dommutations and drift, developmental plasticity produces vari-
able and active organisms that engage with their environment.
The core of heredity, one of the main supporting beams of
the received view, doesn’t have to be the persistence of traits
due to un-interrupted channels of genetic transmission. Instead,
self-organizational properties of the system actively create and
construct both stability (heredity) and variability (adaptabil-
ity) through the availability of developmental resources in every
generation. Table 1 describes the main tenets of an Extended
Evolutionary Synthesis as sketched earlier in the paper.
As argued here, an extended evolutionary theory is reciprocally
related to the view of a cognitive system as embodied, embedded,
enacted, and extended, promoted recently by many proponents
in cognitive science. There are plenty of older thinkers who have
promoted similar ideas and present therefore part of the heritage
of this view1. For the particular argument in this section, and
indeed this paper, which are related to the relationship between
biological development and evolution with a view of cognition, a
very important proponent has been Jean Piaget. His main subject
of study was the origin of knowledge:
Of course the most fruitful, most obvious field of study would be
reconstituting human history—the history of human thinking in
prehistoric man. . . . Since this field of biogenesis is not available
to us, we shall do as biologists do and turn to ontogenesis. (Piaget,
1970, p. 13).
1There are indeed many differences between the different views, such as
between enacted and extended, or embodied and radical embodied cognition.
For the argument of this paper, however, the many facets of these views and
where and how they disagree with each other should not concern us.
Table 1 | A comparison between the modern and the extended synthesis.
Evolutionary mechanism Modern synthesis Extended synthesis
Variation Mutation, recombination Mutation, recombination, developmental plasticity, variability
Inheritance Genetic inheritance Genetic (incl. assimilation and accommodation), epigenetic, ecological,
behavioral/cultural, symbolic inheritance; parental effects,
developmental niche construction
Natural Selection/adaptation Independent external force on population Niche construction
Complex adaptive systems; adaptability; evolvability
Adaptation Genetic solution to environmental problem Active mind in active body embedded in world
Development Genetic program Interactive construction, developmental niche
Organism Passive object in hostile world Active agent in own evolution
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In painstaking psychogenetic studies, Piaget established that
organisms are not passive achievers of knowledge or reactors to
external conditions; to the contrary, the system seeks its own
experience and reacts to stimuli with active and creative changes
in itself and in the environment. Piaget’s genetic epistemology
gave a plausible explanation for the relation between cognition
and action (as the Santiago School of Maturana and Varela put
it: no cognition without action, and no action without cogni-
tion). Piaget emphasized the emergence of cognitive abilities out
of a groundwork of sensorimotor abilities. At the beginning of an
interaction there is no subject and no object. Both result from the
internal organization of the subject’s experience with the exter-
nal. For Piaget, boundaries between the cognitive subject and
the outside object were not given qualities but created categories
of the world. The cognitive system was the subject-environment
unity. Piaget attempted to show the constructivist-interactionist
power between the two antagonistic mechanisms of life: organi-
zation and adaptation - maintenance and change - essential for
every natural process, like development, evolution, and cogni-
tion. Development, in this view, is the construction of all kinds
of causal factors—genetic, epigenetic, ecological, social and cul-
tural factors—which interact together in a self-organized and not
centrally controlled manner (Stotz, 1996). His understanding of
ontogenesis hugely influenced his conception of evolution. Piaget
was one of the first to take a developmental perspective on evo-
lutionary processes. His genetic epistemology was a biology of
knowledge based on an evolutionary theory situated between the
extremes of (neo-) Darwinism and Lamarckism. Behavior is seen
as a driving force in evolution, and an adaptation to the environ-
ment is understood as the result of an interactive construction of
self and the environment.
Before going through the main tenets of evolutionary the-
ory, variation, heredity, selection and adaptation, and the role the
active organism is playing in all of them, we first have to address
the very preconditions for biological evolution. Organisms as they
exist today may owe their existence to evolution, but the evo-
lutionary process in turn crucially depends on the existence of
living systems that exhibit the necessary preconditions, namely
the capacity to (a) produce variation (variability), (b) trans-
mit information for the reconstruction of the life cycle to the
next generation (heritability), and (c) adapt the behavior to the
contingencies of the environment (adaptability). In summary,
populations of organisms must exhibit the ability to evolve,
the production of heritable variation in fitness, i.e., differential
reproductive success (evolvability). These preconditions, if ful-
filled, produce natural selection. Organisms are not just actively
engaged in the business of being alive—“acting on their own
behalf” (Kauffman, 2000), they are at the same time creating the
pre-conditions for evolution, and actively shape the evolutionary
process.
There are two main ways they do so: the developing organ-
ism can modify the selection pressure acting on the population
via the processes of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 2003)
and cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985); or the devel-
opmental system can actively create evolutionary novelties and
variation, since new variations are the raw material of evolution.
For Piaget the “central problem remains”: is the environment
through its influence on development and behavior “also a causal
factor in the actual formation of morphological characteristics”
(Piaget, 1978, p. xi)? The extended evolutionary synthesis entails
the belief that “the environment not only selects variation, it helps
construct variation” (Gilbert and Epel, 2009, p. 369). Hence, the
second way to shape the evolutionary process is by creating dif-
ferent and interacting channels of heredity with varying degree of
reliability and adaptive plasticity that help to recreate and modify
the life cycles of the next generations.
The hypothesis of molecular epigenesis, which could only be
sketched here in a rough outline but is substantiated by 20 years
of experimental research, very strongly supports the developmen-
tal plasticity exhibited by almost all organisms in a more or less
extensive degree. Hence the developmental process, during which
the organism is in a very tight relationship to its developmen-
tal environment, is potentially a very important contributor to
heritable variation.
Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on
the active role of organisms in exploring and shaping their
own environment, and the role of these environmental resources
for cognition. Within cognitive science, with its long history
of interpreting the mind as a disembodied symbol-processing
machine, 4E cognition has been treated as quite a radical depar-
ture. Approaches such as situated, enacted, embodied, embed-
ded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition
look beyond “what is inside your head” to the old Gibsonian
question of “what your head is inside of” and with which it
forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche.
Similar embodied and extended views have been proposed within
(philosophy of) biology, most notably Developmental Systems
Theory and the theories of (selective) and developmental niche
construction.
These two views are sometimes seen as mere analogies to
each other. From the view of embodied and enacted cognition,
in particular, this should immediately be seen as a mistake. The
developmental construction intimately relates to the construc-
tion of cognition, since biological brains are the control systems
for biological bodies. Cognition is the organism’s permanent
interaction with the world. Even more so in organisms with com-
plicated brains while interacting with the world they permanently
construe this world, which in turn influences its impact on devel-
opment. The mind can only be understood in the context of its
relationship to a physical body, which allows it to interact with
the world. This world in turn is part of the biological and cogni-
tive system. The body or the mind alone is often not a meaningful
unit of analysis because of the dense and continuous information
flow between mind, body and world.
The relationship between an active developing system with
exploring cognitive abilities and its capacity to construct its own
living environment—and that for its descendents—becomes
immediately obvious. Since the organism-environment rela-
tionship creates selection pressures that will have an important
feedback on the phenotype of future generations, the organism
indirectly and partially controls its own evolution. This argument
has been extensively developed and defended by Odling-Smee,
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Laland and Feldman (e.g., 2003). The important role of niche
construction and scaffolded or extended cognition particularly
for human evolution has also been widely argued for (e.g.,
Sterelny, 2003, 2010; Wheeler and Clark, 2008). But the rela-
tionship of the active organism, embedded in its environment,
and developmental plasticity to create evolutionary variation
and innovations crucially depends on its ability to make these
modifications heritable.
Only quite recently did new mechanisms come to light
that showed to what extent heredity is indeed a developmen-
tal achievement, as the embryologists of the nineteenth century
have argued. First, epigenetic mechanisms inherited through
the germline made the idea more palatable to biologists, for
whom any transmission outside the germ line was previously
principally excluded from consideration. There were earlier
hypotheses, notably genetic assimilation and accommodation,
that that afforded explanation seemingly Lamarckian phenom-
ena by genetic inheritance, widely construed. But since inher-
itance has now been somewhat detached from its dogmatic
relationship with the genetic system, it becomes possible to inter-
pret other transgenerational transmissions as inherited. Parental
effects have long been recognized as a main contributor to the off-
spring phenotype. This phenotype develops out of contributions
received from the parents (both genetically and behaviorally)
and environmental contributions. Why should some of these
trans-generationally transmitted resources not be accepted as
contributing to the inheritance of the offspring, as long as they
influence the dynamics of evolution?
But all of these exogenetic contributions of inheritance rely
critically on the active organism embedded in its own niche,
namely caring for its offspring (like the nutritional contribution
to the egg, the positioning of the seeds, and parental care in birds
and mammals), and the organism’s complex relationship with its
offspring that actively co-construct the offspring’s developmental
niche. Epigenetic, behavioral, ecological, and epistemic inheri-
tance depends on the environment experienced and provided by
the parent.
This paper couldn’t possibly focus on all aspects of an extended
evolutionary synthesis and has chosen the, from the author’s per-
spective, most important but also most highly debated aspect,
namely non-genetic inheritance. Within this area the paper has
barely touched cultural inheritance because most papers on
extended inheritance and its importance particularly for human
development and evolution has focused on that. Instead it
stressed particularly those aspects of extended inheritance that
lie between genetic and cultural inheritance, the still gray area of
epigenetic and behavioral inheritance systems that play a role in
parental effects. These are the processes that can be regarded as
transgenerational developmental plasticity and that I think can
most fruitfully contribute to, and be investigated by, an extended
evolutionary psychology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I want to thank two blind reviewers and particularly the
editor Danielle Sulikowski for many helpful comments. This
project/publication was made possible through the sup-
port of an Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects
(project number 0878650), and a grant from the Templeton
World Charity Foundation: Causal Foundations of Biological
Information TWCF0063/AB37. The opinions expressed in this
publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Templeton World Charity Foundation.
REFERENCES
Alberts, J. R. (2008). The nature of nurturant niches in ontogeny. Philos. Psychol.
21, 295–303. doi: 10.1080/09515080802169814
Alberts, J. R., and Schank, J. C. (2006). “Constructing ontogenetic niches,” in
Artificial Life X: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on the
Simulation and Synthesis of Living Systems, eds L. M. Rocha, L. S. Yaeger, M.
A. Bedau, D. Floreano, R. L. Goldstone, and A. Vespignani (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press; Bradford books), 155–156.
Badyaev, A. V., andUller, T. (2009). Parental effects in ecology and evolution: mech-
anisms, processes, and implications. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1169–1177. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0302
Barrett, L., Pollet, T. V., and Stulp, G. (2014). From computers to cultivation: recon-
ceptualizing evolutionary psychology. Front. Psychol. 5:867. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00867
Bateson, P., and Gluckman, P. D. (2011). Plasticity, Robustness, Development and
Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bjorklund, D. F. (2006). Mother knows best: epigenetic inheritance, maternal
effects, and the evolution of human intelligence. Dev. Rev. 26, 213–242. doi:
10.1016/j.dr.2006.02.007
Bonasio, R., Tu, S., and Reinberg, D. (2010). Molcecular signals of epigenetic states.
Science 330, 612–616. doi: 10.1126/science.1191078
Bonduriansky, R. (2012). Rethinking heredity, again. Trends Ecol. Evol. 27, 330–336.
doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2012.02.003
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Adolphs, R., Carter, S. C., Davidson, R. J.,
McClintock, M. K., et al. (2002). Foundations in Social Neuroscience. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Champagne, F. A., and Curley, J. P. (2009). Epigenetic mechanisms mediating the
long-term effects of maternal care on development. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33,
593–600. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.10.009
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1997). Evolutionary Psychology: a Primer. Available
online at: http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html
Craig, L. R. (2010). The so-called extended synthesis and population genetics. Biol.
Theory 5, 117–123. doi: 10.1162/BIOT_a_00035
Crick, F. H. C. (1958). On protein synthesis. Symp. Soc. Exp. Biol. 12,
138–163.
Danchin, É., Charmantier, A., Champagne, F. A., Mesoudi, A., Pujol, B.,
and Blanchet, S. (2011). Beyond DNA: integrating inclusive inheritance
into an extended theory of evolution. Nat. Rev. Genet. 12, 475–486. doi:
10.1038/nrg3028
Davidson, E., and Levine, M. (2005). Gene regulatory networks. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 102, 4935. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0502024102
Donald, M. (2000a). “The central role of culture in cognitive evolution: a reflection
on the myth of the “isolated mind”,” in Culture, Thought and Development, eds
L. Nucci, G. B. Saxe, and E. Turiel (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates),
19–38.
Donald, M. (2000b). Cognitive Evolution and the Definition of Human Nature. Little
Rock, AR: Morris Foundation.
Geary, D. C., and Bjorklund, D. F. (2000). Evolutionary developmental psychology.
Child Dev. 71, 57–65. doi: 10.1111/1467-8624.00118
Gilbert, S., and Epel, D. (2009). Ecological Developmental Biology:
Integrating Epigenetics, Medicine, and Evolution. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer
Associates.
Gilbert, S. F. (2003). “The reactive genome,” in Origination of Organismal Form:
Beyond the Gene in Developmental and Evolutionary Biology, eds G. B. Müller
and S. A. Newman (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 87–101.
Gissis, S. B., and Jablonka, E. (2011). Transformations of Lamarckism: from Subtle
Fluids to Molecular Biology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gottlieb, G. (2001). “A developmental psychobiological systems view: early formu-
lation and current status,” in Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and
Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 908 | 12
Stotz Extended evolutionary psychology
Evolution, eds S. Oyama, P. E. Griffiths, and R. D. Gray (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 41–54.
Griffiths, P. E., and Gray, R. D. (1994). Developmental systems and evolutionary
explanation. J. Philos. 91, 277–304. doi: 10.2307/2940982
Griffiths, P. E., and Stotz, K. (2000). How the mind grows: a developmen-
tal perspective on the biology of cognition. Synthese 122, 29–51. doi:
10.1023/A:1005215909498
Griffiths, P. E., and Stotz, K. (2013). Genetics and Philosophy: an Introduction.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, B. K. (1999). Evolutionary Developmental Biology, 2nd Edn. Dortrecht:
Kluwer.
Hall, B. K. (2011). “A brief history of the term and concept of Epigenetics,” in
Epigenetics: Linking Genotype and Phenotype in Develoment and Evolution, eds
B. Hallgrimsson and B. K. Hall (Berkeley, CA:University of California Press),
9–13.
Hallgrimsson, B., and Hall, B. K. (2011). “Introduction,” in Epigenetics: Linking
Genotype and Phenotype in Develoment and Evolution, eds B. Hallgrimsson and
B. K. Hall (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 1–5.
Holliday, R. (2006). Epigenetics: a historical overview. Epigenetics 1, 76–80. doi:
10.4161/epi.1.2.2762
Jablonka, E., and Lamb, M. J. (1995). Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: the
Lamarkian Dimension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jablonka, E., and Lamb, M. J. (2005). Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic,
Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Jablonka, E., and Raz, G. (2009). Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance: preva-
lence, mechanisms, and implications for the study of heredity and evolution.
Q. Rev. Biol. 84, 131–176. doi: 10.1086/598822
Kauffman, S. A. (1969). Metabolic stability and epigenesis in randomly con-
structed genetic nets. J. Theor. Biol. 22, 434–467. doi: 10.1016/0022-5193(69)
90015-0
Kauffman, S. A. (2000). Investigations. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Kirschner, M. W., and Gerhart, J. C. (2010). “Facilitated variation,” in Evolution:
The Extended Synthesis, eds G. B. Mueller and M. Pigliucci (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press), 253–280.
Kuryatov, A., Laube, B., Betz, H., and Kuhse, J. (1994). Mutational analysis of the
glycine-binding site of the NMDA receptor: structural similarity with bacte-
rial amino acid-binding proteins. Neuron 12, 1291–1300. doi: 10.1016/0896-
6273(94)90445-6
Lamm, E., and Jablonka, E. (2008). The nurture of nature: hereditary plas-
ticity in evolution. Philos. Psychol. 21, 305–319. doi: 10.1080/09515080802
170093
Lehrman, D. S. (1970). “Semantic & conceptual issues in the nature-nurture prob-
lem,” inDevelopment & Evolution of Behaviour, edD. S. Lehrman (San Francisco,
CA: W. H. Freeman and co), 17–52.
Maestripieri, D., and Mateo, J. M. (2009). Maternal Effects in Mammals. Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press.
McGonigle, B. O., and Chalmers, M. (2008). Putting Descartes before the horse
(again!). Commentary on Penn, D., Povinelli, D.J and Holyoak, K. J. Behav.
Brain Sci. 31, 142–143. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X08003683
Meaney, M. J. (2001). Maternal care, gene expression, and the transmission of indi-
vidual differences in stress reactivity across generations. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24,
1161–1192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.1161
Meaney, M. J., and Szyf, M. (2005). Environmental programming of stress
responses through DNA methylation: life at the interface between a
dynamic environment and a fixed genome. Dialogues Clin. Neurosci. 7,
103–123.
Menary, R. (2010). Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition. Phenomenol.
Cogn. Sci. 9, 459–463. doi: 10.1007/s11097-010-9187-6
Michel, G. F., and Moore, C. L. (1995). Developmental Psychobiology: an
Interdisciplinary Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Moore, C. L. (2003). Differences between organism-environment systems con-
ceived by Lehrman and Gibson: what’s in the nest of reciprocities matters. Dev.
Psychobiol. 42, 349–356. doi: 10.1002/dev.10108
Mousseau, T. A., and Fox, C. W. (1998). Maternal Effects as Adaptations. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N., and Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche Construction:
the Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Oyama, S. (1999). “The nurturing of natures,” in On Human Nature.
Anthropological, Biological and Philosophical Foundations, eds A. Grunwald,
M. Gutmann, and E. M. Neumann-Held (New York, NY: Springer),
163–170.
Oyama, S., Griffiths, P. E., and Gray, R. D. (eds.). (2001). “Introduction: what
is developmental systems theory?,” in Cycles of Contingency: Developmental
Systems and Evolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Piaget, J. (1970).Genetic Epistemology. New York, NY:W.W. Norton and Company.
Piaget, J. (1978). Behavior and Evolution. Transl. by Nicholson-Smith. New York,
NY: Pantheon Books.
Pigliucci, M. (2007). Do we need an extended evolutionary Synthesis? Rev. Evol. 61,
2743–2749. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00246.x
Pigliucci, M. (2009). An extended synthesis for evolutionay biology.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1168, 218–228. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.
04578.x
Pigliucci, M., and Kaplan, J. (2006). Making Sense of Evolution: the Conceptual
Foundations of Evolutionary Biology. Chicago; London: University of Chicago
Press.
Pigliucci, M., andMüller, G. B. (2010). “Elements of an extended evolutionary syn-
thesis,” in Evolution: The Extended Synthesis, eds M. Pigliucci and G. B. Müller
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 3–17.
Ptashne,M., and Gann, A. (2002).Genes and Signals. Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory Press.
Sarkar, S. (1996). “Biological information: a sceptical look at some central dog-
mas of molecular biology,” in The Philosophy and History of Molecular Biology:
New Perspectives, ed S. Sarkar (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers),
187–232.
Schneirla, T. C. (1957). “The concept of development in comparative psychology,”
in The concept of development, ed D. B. Harris (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press), 78–108.
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: extended or scaffolded? Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 9,
465–481. doi: 10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y
Stotz, K. (1996). The psychology of knowledge in the context of evolutionary the-
ory: reflections on the link between cognition and sociability. Evol. Cogn. 2,
22–37.
Stotz, K. (2006a). With genes like that, who needs an environment? Postgenomics’
argument for the ontogeny of information. Philos. Sci. 73, 905–917. doi:
10.1086/518748
Stotz, K. (2006b). Molecular epigenesis: distributed specificity as a break in the
central dogma’. Hist. Philos. Life Sci. 28, 527–544.
Stotz, K. (2006c). “Constructing your environment: from developmental systems to
extended minds,” in Artificial Life, eds L. M. Rocha, L. S. Yaeger, M. A. Bedau, D.
Floreano, R. L. Goldstone, and A. Vespignani (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press;
Bradford Books), 157–158.
Stotz, K., and Allen, C. (eds.). (2008). Reconciling nature and nurture in the study of
behavior. Philos. Psychol. 21 (Special Issue).
Stotz, K. (2010). Human nature and cognitive-developmental niche con-
struction. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 9, 483–501. doi: 10.1007/s11097-010-
9178-7
Stotz, K., and Allen, C. (eds.). (2008). Reconciling Nature and Nurture in the Study
of Behavior, Philosophical Psychology, 21.
Stotz, K., and Allen, C. (2012). “From cell-surface receptors to higher learning:
a whole world of experience,” in Philosophy of Behavioural Biology, eds K.
Plaisance and T. Reydon (Boston, MA: Springer), 85–123. doi: 10.1007/978-94-
007-1951-4_5
Tomasello, M. (2000). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press (First Paperback Edition).
Uller, T. (2012). “Parental effects in development and evolution,” inThe Evolution of
Parental Care, eds N. J. Royle, Per T. Smiseth, and M. Kölliker (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 247–266.
Waddington, C. H. (1953a). Genetic assimilation of an acquired character.
Evolution 7, 118–126. doi: 10.2307/2405747
Waddington, C. H. (1953b). The “Baldin Effect,” “Genetic Assimilation” and
“Homeostasis.” Evolution 7, 386–387. doi: 10.2307/2405346
Wade, M. J. (1998). “The evolutionary genetics of maternal effects,” in Maternal
Effects as Adaptations, eds T. A. Mousseau and C. W. Fox (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 5–21.
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 908 | 13
Stotz Extended evolutionary psychology
West, M. J., and King, A. P. (1987). Settling nature and nurture into an ontogenetic
niche. Dev. Psychobiol. 20, 549–562. doi: 10.1002/dev.420200508
West, M. J., and King, A. P. (2008). Deconstructing innate illusions: reflections on
nature-nurture-niche from an unlikely source. Philos. Psychol. 21, 383–395. doi:
10.1080/09515080802200999
West, M. J., King, A. P., and Arberg, A. A. (1988). “The inheritance of niches,”
in Handbook of Behavioral Neurobiology: Developmental Psychobiology and
Behavioral Ecology, ed E. M. Blass (New York, NY: Springer), 41–62.
West, M. J., King, A. P., andWhite, D. J. (2003). The case for developmental ecology.
Anim. Behav. 66, 617–622. doi: 10.1006/anbe.2003.2221
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003). Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wheeler, M., and Clark, A. (2008). Culture, embodiment and genes: unravelling
the triple helix. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 363, 3563–3575. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2008.0135
Wilkins, A. (2011). Epigenetic inheritance: where does the field stand today? What
do we still need to know? in Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle
Fluids to Molecular Biology, eds S. B. Gissis and E. Jablonka (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press), 389–393. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015141.
003.0040
Youngson, N. A., and Whitelaw, E. (2008). Transgenerational epigenetic effects.
Annu. Rev. Genomics Hum. Genet. 9, 233–257. doi: 10.1146/annurev.genom.9.
081307.164445
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 21 April 2014; accepted: 30 July 2014; published online: 20 August 2014.
Citation: Stotz K (2014) Extended evolutionary psychology: the importance of
transgenerational developmental plasticity. Front. Psychol. 5:908. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00908
This article was submitted to Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience, a section of
the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Stotz. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 908 | 14
